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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the consequences of child participation in armed combat. It argues that 
democratization studies have neglected this variable of child soldiers when assessing the 
requirements necessary for democratic political development. This thesis demonstrates that child 
soldiers are a threat to the establishment of democratic polities in those countries where they are 
active. As a result, it recommends that greater attention be given to the phenomenon of child 
soldiers. This thesis argues that child soldiers are a critical force within a country's civil society. 
Consequently, it argues that specific measures must be taken to assist child soldiers re-integrate 
into civil society, for democratic political institutions do not function independently of social 
forces. As such, child soldiers are an influential force in determining the success and longevity 
of emerging democratic polities. 
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Introduction 
The past decade witnessed remarkable transitions from authoritarian governments to 
democracies, whether it be military rule in Latin America or Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. To date, most attention focuses on the political institutions necessary for democratic 
systems to emerge and flourish. This institutional-centred approach, however, is limited in 
explaining the failure of democratic transitions in a number of societies where civil strife is 
perpetual. Often the source ofthe problem lies in society, not its political institutions. As 
Huntington observes, "In the total absence of social conflict, political institutions are 
unnecessary; in the total absence of social harmony, they are impossible." 1 
In many societies civil strife is perpetual, passing from generation to generation. 
Consequently, a political culture of violence .and instability develops. This culture of violence 
precludes the creation of political institutions which could facilitate a transition to, and 
consolidation of, some form of democratic government. 
While the role of the military has been analyzed extensively in studies of democratic 
transitions, the consequences of the participation of children in the military has not. However, 
child soldiers and the participation of children in military conflict are crucial to explaining the 
failure of democratization in many countries. This thesis examines the literature on 
democratization, and assesses the role of child soldiers. More importantly, the role of child 
soldiers is examined in light of the consequences for democratic political development. 
Chapter One outlines the omission of child soldiers as a variable in the literature on 
democratic political development. This chapter analyzes literature specific to transitions and 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, (New Haven, USA: Yale University 
Press, 1968), p. 9. 
1 
democratization. In doing so it focuses particular attention on the role of the military, in 
explaining successes and failures in transitions to democracy, and brings to attention the 
existence of child soldiers. 
2 
Chapter Two briefly explains the background conditions fostering the roots of violence in 
many countries experiencing violent civil strife. It then analyzes the causes and forces which 
result in the recruitment of child soldiers. 
Chapter Three considers the consequences of child participation in armed combat. The 
chapter assesses these consequences at both micro and macro levels of society, and focuses 
particular attention on the consequences for democratic political development. 
Chapter Four assesses the measures undertaken thus far, at national and international 
levels, in attempting to eliminate and prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. Furthermore, the 
chapter examines structures assisting the demobilization and re-integration to civil society of 
child soldiers. It argues that such measures and structures are essential in aiding the development 
of democratic institutions, in that they minimise potential for further violence, thus providing the 
social stability necessary for democratic political development. 
Chapter One 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Child Soldiers. The Neglected Variable. 
Introduction 
3 
Understanding the conditions necessary for the creation of democratic polities remains a 
fundamental problem for students of comparative politics. From the liberal modernization 
theorists of the 1950s and 60s to the democratic transition theorists of the 1980s and 90s, 
scholars in successive waves have grappled with the problem of democratic political 
development. Despite these efforts, we still do not have an adequate understanding of why 
democratization succeeds in some countries but not in others. This chapter examines current 
explanations of democratic political development. It outlines two main contemporary 
approaches: transition theory and democratization theory. The chapter then turns its attention to 
the role of the military in democratic political development. Against this background, the 
chapter examines current accounts of successes and failures in democratic transitions. The 
chapter then proceeds to argue that the phenomenon of child soldiers is a pivotal but neglected 
variable in explaining the failure of democratic development in many countries experiencing 
perpetual civil strife. Finally, it explains how the phenomenon of child soldiers is analytically 
distinct from the question of the role of the military. 
Explaining Democratic Political Development 
Following the end of the Second World War, the processes of decolonization led to the 
rise of the study of political development and democratization. Beginning in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, liberal modernization theorists such as Seymour Lipset, Karl Deutsch, and Walt 
Rostow advanced the argument that the process of modernization (economic growth, 
32. 
urbanization, increased literacy, and so forth) would lead to the development of healthy, stable 
democracies. However, by the end of the 1960s the hopes of many liberal modernization 
theorists began to fade as numerous countries in Latin America, post-colonial Africa, and Asia 
appeared to fall into a cyclical pattern of political violence and instability. 
Against the convention of his time, Samuel Huntington offered an institutionalist 
explanation for this political violence. He argued that modernization often led to, not mitigated, 
political instability. 1 In many developing countries, rapid social change and the mobilization of 
new groups into politics outpaced the creation of political institutions capable of effective 
governance. As a result, political decay rather than political development took place. Political 
order, he argued, was a pre-requisite for the development of democratic institutions. 
4 
At the start of the 1970s, authoritarian rule, instability and political violence marked 
many, if not most, developing countries. The developing world, however, was not the only place 
where one could find patterns of authoritarian rule or political violence. In the 1970s 
authoritarian regimes still ruled Spain and Greece, for instance, and violence and politics were 
synonymous in Northern Ireland and Israel. However, this situation began to change. Starting in 
Southern Europe in the 1970s, swelling in Latin America in the 1980s, and sweeping through 
Eastern Europe in 1989, the wave of democratization suggested that enduring democratic 
transitions from authoritarian rule were possible. 
In response to this wave of democratization, two main approaches to the study of 
democratic political development emerged: transition theory and democratization theory. As is 
often the case with social science theory, it is difficult to make a sharp distinction between the 
1Samuel Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-
5 
two approaches, as there is considerable overlap between them. Transition theorists, however, 
focus on the specific stages and processes of transition away from authoritarian rule and pay 
most attention to competing political elites and their institutions. Democratization theorists, on 
the other hand, tend to explore the broader issues of democratic political development and extend 
their focus to include larger social forces (instead of elites) in the movement toward building 
democratic politics. Each approach is discussed below. 
Transition Theory 
For transition theorists, understanding democratic political development means 
understanding the stages and mechanisms of movements away from authoritarian rule. 
Transition theorists identify two main stages in transitions away from authoritarian rule: 
transition and consolidation. 
The transition stage refers to the period between one political regime and another. It 
involves the dissolution of one set of governing structures and the set up of another.2 Although 
these new governing structures can be democratic, authoritarian, or an alternative revolutionary 
style of government, transition theorists are concerned with movements leading toward 
democratic politics. Paramount to transition theorists are changes which are institutional, rather 
than social. While social changes may occur they do not necessarily parallel those within the 
political sphere. Thus, a transition may produce democratic political institutions while not 
necessarily developing a democratic society to support such institutions.3 Within transitions 
2Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
conclusions about uncertain democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 7. 
3Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Problems of democracy in Latin America: On the Processes of transition and 
consolidation," International Journal, XLIII (Summer 1988), 360. 
6 
there are two linked, but analytically distinct, processes. These are liberalization and 
democratization. 
The liberalization phase usually marks the beginning of a country' s transition process. It 
is the process of "redefining and extending rights" to both individuals and social groups, and is 
often marked by the opening of trade and the adoption of free market policies.4 Liberalization is 
the process which creates "rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or 
illegal acts committed by the state or third parties." Furthermore, these rights include 
classical elements of the liberal tradition: habeas corpus; sanctity of private 
home and correspondence; the right to be defended in a fair trial according 
to preestablished laws; freedom of movement, speech, and petition; and so 
forth. 5 
Historically, civil rights were the purveyor of political rights. As such, they are viewed by many 
as a cornerstone of democratic political development. It is this that makes liberalization a key 
process in a transition, for it is during liberalization that civil rights are developed. 
Whereas liberalization involves granting fundamental civil rights and freedoms, 
democratization entails the acquisition of political rights. Political rights are those rights which 
embody citizenship. They are the key element to democratization. Democratization is thus 
defined by O'Donnell and Schmitter as 
the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either 
applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles 
(e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, or administrative 
practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such 
rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic 
minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions 
not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military 
4Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
conclusions about uncertain democracies, 7. 
51bid.,7. 
establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive 
enterprises, educational institutions, etc.).6 
7 
Other theorists, such as Manuel Antonio Garreton, extend the definition of democratization to 
include larger processes of social change and welfare, leading to what he terms a 'democratic 
society. ' 7 
According to transition theorists such as O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Adam Przeworski, 
political transitions usually occur when an authoritarian regime begins to show signs of 
vulnerability, which is a result of several factors. One factor is that the regime has attained the 
immediate goals it set out to establish, and it is therefore no longer needed, or indeed possible, 
and as such collapses. The second is that the regime has lost its legitimacy, for whatever reason, 
and thus disintegrates. A third is a result of conflict within the ruling elite, particularly the 
military, which cannot be resolved without the aid of groups outside of the elite. A fourth factor 
which can trigger a transition is international pressure to assume a democratic front, which may 
result in compromises between various groups. 8 
Many scholars argue, however, that internal crises (such as conflict within the ruling 
elite) are the key agents triggering a transition process. These internal crises almost always 
involve the military forces in one form or another. As such, the military often plays a critical 
role in determining not only the course the transition will take, but more importantly, its 
6Ibid, 8. 
70ther scholars, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter, refer to the expansion of social welfare rights as 
socialization. In their model, socialization is the process which results in social and economic democracy, that is, 
the provision of "equal benefits to the population from the goods and services generated by society: wealth, 
income, education, health, housing, information, leisure time, even autonomy, prestige, respect, and self 
development." Ibid., 12. 
8Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, ed by Guillermo 0 ' Donnell , Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 47-63. 
8 
outcome. If a transition is successful, a country will move to consolidate the new regime. A 
successful transition, however, does not automatically ensure consolidation. 
The consolidation stage refers to the entrenchment of the new democratic regime, by 
which new institutions and rules of democracy are reinforced and accepted by all major players 
(business, labour, military, political parties etc.), thus reducing the risks of threats and challenges 
to the new regime from such quarters.9 While many countries go through the transition toward 
democracy, few are able to reach the ultimate goal of consolidating a democratic regime. As 
observers comment, outside of Southern Europe, "most other countries appear to be languishing, 
well short of meeting the criterion of a consolidated democracy, in some sort ofhalf-way 
house."10 Why is this? 
Some scholars, such as Przeworski, argue that the longevity of new democracies is 
dependant upon their economic performance, while others such as Huntington assert that it is the 
type and nature of the preceding regime that influences whether or not consolidation will take 
place. While O'Donnell supports the relevance of the preceding regime's legacy, economic and 
otherwise, he extends the argument to include the role of civil society in the consolidation 
process. Just as political institutions are vital in facilitating the transition process, so too are civil 
societies vital in their consolidation. 
Democratization Theory 
In contrast to the relatively narrow institutional approach of transition theorists, 
9Geraldo L. Munck, "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics, April 
1994, 355-375. 
101bid., }62. 
9 
democratization theorists focus their discussion instead on broader social issues of democratic 
political development. As such, democratization theorists have long debated which of these two 
approaches (transition or democratization) affords greater understanding to the establishment of a 
democratic system of government. Many, such as Dankwart Rustow, argue that a country 
requires a certain set of preconditions in order to successfully move from authoritarian rule to 
democracy. 11 These preconditions include economic, social, and cultural factors, and to some 
degree focus greater attention on societal factors as opposed to institution building. In some 
ways this belief is connected to theories of "political development," whereby a country's political 
development is gauged to a large degree by its economic development. This view is driven by 
the belief that a fledgling democracy cannot develop successfully without a prosperous base from 
which to work. 12 As Seymour Lipset hypothesized more than thirty years ago, "The more well-
to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy."13 This belief was widely 
supported, and while it is true that "where the members of a community suffer from chronic 
malnutrition and frequent illness, participation in common affairs that is both broad and deep is 
difficult to maintain ... and the expectation of genuine democracy among such masses is naive," 
this view is nevertheless not universally applicable. 14 There are numerous countries that exhibit 
strong economies but are ruled by non-democratic governments. Examples of such countries 
include Korea and China, the latter of which demonstrated this point through the massacre at 
11Despite the fact that Rustow's work is a decade earlier than the mainstream of transition theory, the 
concerns he addresses are pertinent to a discussion of democratization and transition today. 
12David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Quality Press, 1987). 
13Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: economic development and political 
legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 75. 
14Carl Cohen, Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1971), 109. 
10 
Tiananmen Square, showing that economic growth does not guarantee civil and political rights. 
Rustow, therefore, argues that the most important precondition is not economic stability, 
but rather national unityY According to Rustow's 'Transition Toward Democracy' model, 
national unity exists where "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy to-be ... have no doubt or 
. mental reservations as to which political community they belong to."16 He acknowledges that 
there may be ethnic or other group divisions within the population, but asserts that this only 
becomes a problem when those divisions challenge the boundaries of national unity and 
consequently cause doubts regarding the political community to which they belong, or should 
belong. 
Other democratization theorists, such as Terry Lynn Karl, argue that it is futile to search 
for preconditions for democracy as each country has unique features which make for varying · 
styles of transition. Furthermore, Karl argues that it is democratic political institutions that 
create the necessary conditions for a democratic society. In other words, that which scholars 
consider to be the preconditions for democracy, might instead be the result of democracy. Thus, 
Karl argues scholars should focus their efforts on the modes of transition, rather than on 
preconditions and institutions, for it is the nature of the transition that will ultimately affect the 
outcome. 17 
15Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2:3 
(April, 1970): 350. 
161bid., 350. 
17Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Political Dynamics: 
Global Research Perspectives. Ed. by Dankwart Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson (New York: Harper Collins 
1991), 163-191. 
11 
Military 
Whatever the mode of transition, military and revolutionary groups are often critical 
players influencing democratic political development. Because of their importance, they deserve 
specific attention. In particular, the nature and legacy of military and revolutionary groups 
within a civil society are key variables in explaining why some countries are able to move 
successfully through a transition toward consolidation while others are not. Scholars have long 
recognized the military as pivotal in political development. As Huntington reminds us, "As 
society changes, so does the role of the military ... The extent to which a politicized officer corps 
plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political 
participation in the society."18 Political economists typically analyze the nature of the military 
with a class analysis framework. They believe that class largely determines the nature of the role 
the military plays, who the military defends and protects, and who they attempt to control or 
eliminate. By contrast, statists see the military as potentially autonomous from class interests. 
For instance, Trimberger' s analysis of the Meiji restoration in Japan (1868) and the Ataturk 
revolution in Turkey (1919-1923) shows that military elites undertook revolutions from above, 
even against the interest of dominant classes. These revolutions were unusual in that they 
involved leaders who were already in the elite and who did not draw support from the masses. 19 
Nevertheless, for both political economists and statists, the military is viewed as a critical 
variable in regime change, regardless of the political orientation of the regime.20 
18Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 
221. 
19Ellen Kay Trimberger, "A Theory of Elite Revolutions" Comparative International Development, 7:3 
Falll972, 187-207. 
20 Regime is defmed as a "fonnal defmition of the structure of governing institutions in a country. It is a 
set of formalized rules and procedures for detennining who is to exercise political authority and how those 
12 
The recognition of the importance of the role of the military generated a large body of 
literature in North America during the 1960s regarding the rehabilitation of the officers' corps 
into civil society following a violent revolution or coup d'etat. Scholars argued that the stability 
of the military was critical to the stability and overall longevity of the government in power. As 
such, experts suggested that the military be involved in activities that were of a nonmilitary 
nature, but were still of vital importance to the establishment of the government they helped 
bring to power. Such activities included aiding in the re-drafting oflaws and constitutions, and 
in community policing. Scholars hoped that such measures would diffuse feelings of alienation 
within the armed forces and allow for the "normalising" of their status within the nation.21 As 
civil-military relations analyst Claude Welch Jr. has astutely noted, "the consistent but limited 
participation of the military in politics is an important factor that keeps the armed forces in the 
barracks. "22 
The success of such 'normalising' measures, however, was not uniform. These measures 
differed greatly from country to country and were subject to religious, cultural and 
socioeconomic factors. In Turkey, for example, there were three periods of authoritarian rule 
since 1950 (1960-61, 1971-73, and 1980-83). Despite the fact that each period has been 
followed by a renewal of competitive parliamentary democracy, the vacillation between the two 
individuals are to be chosen. It sets the rules within which governments are formed and changed." (Cox, "Why it is 
difficult to teach comparative politics to American students," PS: The Journal of Political Science and Politics, 
XXVI: I [March 1993], 70) 
21 Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 32. 
22Claude E. Welch Jr., No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin 
America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 13. 
13 
systems indicates a political environment prone to crisis.23 Another country which followed a 
similar, if not worse, cycle of instability was Argentina. From 1955 onwards Argentina has 
undergone three constitutional governments and four military juntas, none of which successfully 
managed to consolidate its rule.24 Political stability was thus often reached only after several 
attempts, and was frequently characterized by periods of populist or bureaucratic authoritarian 
rule.25 Despite this, large-scale violence by the military toward the civilian population during 
these periods was generally not present. This lack of widespread violence can be explained by 
the fact that these transitions were planned and executed by groups of elites, who negotiated 
pacts amongst themselves, and which largely excluded the general civilian public. As Guillermo 
O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter, and others have noted in analyzing transitions from authoritarian 
rule in Latin America and elsewhere, processes of transition are generally dominated by ruling 
elites. As such, the extent to which military and revolutionary groups permeate a society is a 
crucial variable in explaining the transitional success of some countries and the perpetual failure 
of others. 
Understandin2 Successes and Failures 
The countries of Southern Europe are the most successful at democratic political 
23llkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," Transitions From 
Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, ed. by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 165-186. 
24Marcelo Cavarozzi, "Political Cycles in Argentina Since 1955," Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: 
Latin America, ed. by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 19-48. 
25 Populist Authoritarian Rule refers to a regime led by a leader with mass popular appeal, brought in by 
the people, for the people. For e.g. Argentina' s Peron. Bureaucratic Authoritarian Rule refers to a regime which is 
less personalized and more institutionally oriented, for e.g. The former Soviet Union. 
14 
development to date. Why were these nations more successful at democratic transitions than 
those of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East? Scholars of democratic political 
development advance several explanations accounting for the successful transitions of Southern 
Europe. One explanation is that their geographical position allowed a greater amount of 
regional support for the democratization process. That is, the other European countries 
surrounding those ofltaly, Greece, Portugal and Spain, had already undergone such transitions 
and were able to act as a valuable support system by aiding and encouraging the process as a 
whole.26 This was not the case within the other regions. 
International powers also played a key part, particularly the United States. Their policies 
toward democratization in Southern Europe were consistently supportive, as opposed to their 
policies toward Latin America and other regions, which have been inconsistent. In some cases 
the United States seemingly undermined democratic transitions by aiding a country' s military 
powers, as in the cases of Guatemala and Nicaragua.27 As important as these international factors 
are, they alone cannot account for Southern Europe' s democratic success. 
In analyzing transitions in Southern Europe, scholars have assessed that one of the most 
fundamental factors in determining the prospects for the development of political democracy was 
internal social forces. More specifically, the less pervasive the military was within society, the 
greater the chance of democratic consolidation. A narrow civil-military base greatly reduces the 
threat the military can impose to civilian rule. Furthermore, levels of violence and repression 
against the civilian population are notably lower during those regime changes where the military 
26 It must be noted that, for several reasons, Turkey is somewhat of an exception to this factor. See 
Guillermo O'Donnell et als, " Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe " (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 4. 
27Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), 
435-527. 
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are not primarily comprised of a large percentage of civilians, but rather involve an elite clique of 
army officials. This has significant consequences. It means that the memory of the civilian 
population is relatively free from violent acts. The people are therefore less likely to demand 
revenge, and as a result are better able to get on with the task of reconstruction. 28 In other words, 
they have a relatively strong civil society (which is not divided against itself by acts of violence) 
out of which emerges relatively cohesive social forces that are able to support and legitimize the 
new order. Thus, Southern Europe, has effectively been able to 'resurrect civil society and 
restructure public space' because of the lack of civil-military violence, despite its subjection to 
authoritarian rule over a more continuous and sustained period of time historically than many 
countries in Latin America. 29 These elements allowed for the creation of more viable civil 
societies within the countries of Southern Europe, as opposed to those countries within other 
regions of the world. 
Analysts recognize that there are numerous other complex historical factors which 
contributed to the resiliency and nature of the Southern European civil societies, which may not 
be the case within others. These include population densities, emigration flows, settlement 
patterns, religious nonconformity, less ethnic stratification, less central city prevalence and 
greater provincial city autonomy, higher levels of pre-industrial literacy, traditions of guild 
organizations, and many others.30 However, the primary emphasis has nevertheless been on the 
ability of these countries to rapidly revive their civil society during the liberalization phase, 
which makes it less likely for the process to fall short of complete democratization. 
28Guillenno O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Southern Europe, 7. 
29 Ibid. , 8. 
30lbid., 7. 
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This process is lacking in many Latin American, African, Asian and Middle Eastern 
States where we see ongoing civil strife today. Instead of immediate liberalization upon 
transition, there is continued authoritarian rule of varying degrees. This leads to a state of 
impasse, resulting in increased violence by opposition groups and government forces alike. 
However, liberalization in many of these countries was not possible because of the explosive 
nature of their military organizations and rebel groups. Unlike the countries of Southern Europe, 
where military power was held by an isolated elite clique of army officials, many nations today 
have militaries that extend pervasively throughout their societies. Thus, the very nature and 
intensity of these conflicts have changed, for power struggles no longer occur merely in an 
established officer corp but rather are widespread across society. Increasingly, these conflicts 
have come to include children. 
Child Soldiers 
Child soldiers make-up a significant percentage of armed groups, be they government or 
rebel forces, around the world. These children are drawn from a wide ranging age group, with 
some as young as four years, and are employed in numerous tasks aiding military or guerilla 
operations. 
In analyzing transitions toward democracy, scholars have failed to recognize the impact 
and affect of child soldiers on the process as a whole. It is imperative that they do so, for these 
child soldiers comprise a vital segment of the civil society which will ultimately support or reject 
new democratic institutions of government. Clearly, the consequences for democratic political 
development are immense. The reasons for their recruitment, as well as the nature and 
consequences of their activities, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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The following chapter proceeds to analyze the causes and forces which result in the 
recruitment of children into military groups, while chapter three assesses the consequences of 
their participation to democratic development. Chapter four analyzes the measures undertaken to 
date in preventing recruitment, as well as assessing rehabilitative structures in place to assist the 
re-integration of child soldiers into civil society. 
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Chapter Two 
Child Soldiers: The Forces behind the Phenomenon. How and Why Do Children and 
Youth become Armed Combatants? 
Explaining the Roots of Violence 
In 1994 and 1995, children participated in armed conflict in thirty-two countries of the 
world, either in government or rebel forces. 1 All were under the age of eighteen, and in twenty 
of the regions many were well under the age offifteen.2 The nwnbers of participants are also 
considerable. In Rwanda, for example, more than four and a half thousand children between the 
ages of ten and eighteen were employed in the killing of one million people, of whom 
approximately three hundred thousand were fellow children.3 These figures represent only those 
areas where conflict is currently occurring or has recently ceased. They do not include many 
other areas such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique where 
recruitment of children into the forces occurred on a large scale and over a sustained period of 
time, but where hostilities have since subsided so as not to warrant inclusion as 'current'. 
This chapter examines how and why children are recruited into armed groups. In doing 
so it analyzes the causes and forces at work which result in children participating in violent 
armed conflict. Such a discussion is essential to understanding the larger consequences for 
1Radda Bamen, "Children of War" ( http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabamen/childsol2.html) 
2In terms of International Law, the minimum age for recruitment today is fifteen, as determined by Article 
38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). However, there is widespread international opinion that the 
defming line between childhood and adulthood should be set at age eighteen. This is in accordance with the above 
Convention, which states the general defmition of a child as being a person under the age of eighteen. That 
governments were given the right to recruit children at fifteen is the result of an unfortunate agreement which 
occurred during negotiations prior to the adoption of the Convention in 1989. 
3Radda Bamen, "Children of War" ( http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabamen/childsol5.html) 
democratic political development. Furthermore, in order to provide tentative solutions to the 
problem of child soldiers, it is first necessary to understand the roots of the problem. 
Background 
In many of the world' s countries experiencing violent internal strife, such as Uganda, 
Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, the roots of violence are embedded in 
unresolved historical, political, and cultural differences. For many countries, the process of de-
colonization in the 1950s and 60s initiated violent conflict. In others, however, this period 
characterized a move toward self determination by ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, 
regardless of origin, the post colonial era of independence is marked by numerous internal civil 
wars as old tensions resurface and factions rival one another for political power. 
Processes of De-Colonization 
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Uganda, for example, gained independence from Great Britain in 1966. As a colony 
Uganda was an extremely successful nation and the colonial powers predicted a continuance of 
this success following independence. However, the colonial structures of government, imposed 
on Uganda by their former rulers, fostered the roots of disunity. The British rulers who 
designated the boundaries of Uganda did not give sufficient attention to social and cultural 
factors. During colonial rule they implemented a system of indirect rule, which indiscriminately 
grouped together peoples of extremely different cultures, languages, and customs into numerous 
rulerships. Furthermore, resources were monopolized by multi-national corporations who 
manipulated tribal groups for their own purposes. Thus, different tribes struggled for economic 
power as well as for political representation. The development of a national identity was thus 
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hindered by animosity between tribal groups, which following independence erupted into a 
violent struggle for power.4 
Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
• Conflicts in other regions have deep historical roots embedded in religious and 
socioeconomic differences. These differences have carried through to modem times and have 
become more complex and deeply rooted with the passing of time. 
Northern Ireland, for example, gained political independence from Great Britain in 1920 
with the separation of the island into two distinct regions, the Republic of Ireland in the south 
and Northern Ireland in the north. Since then Northern Ireland has been bitterly divided between 
the Protestant majority (Unionists) who insist on maintaining ties with England, Scotland and 
Wales, and the Catholic minority (Nationalists) who wish to see the island as one nation.5 
Northern Ireland was self governed but the Protestants dominated both economic and political 
spheres and discrimination against Catholics in housing, jobs and political representation was 
rife. By the late 1960s the Catholic civil rights movement became increasingly angry at such 
discrimination and demanded an end to it. From this time onward tension increased 
significantly, resulting in the suspension ofNorthem Ireland's Parliament in 1972 and the 
establishment of direct rule out of London's House of Commons. 6 Thus, the scene was set for 
4Edward Khiddu-Makubuya, "Violence and Conflict Resolution in Uganda," in The Culture of Violence, 
ed. Kumar Rupesinghe and Marcial Rubio C. (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994), 149. 
5Marc Howard Ross, The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspectives, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 152. 
6 1bid., 153 . 
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violent struggle between two groups whose animosity toward each other is deeply rooted in their 
history even prior to the division of 1920. 
In such political climates dominated by tension and instability, violence often simmers. 
The social upheavals that result when violence erupts are frequently bloody and usually involve 
civilian participation. Even more disturbing is the fact that these conflicts frequently involve the 
widespread participation of children. 
The recruitment of children into government military forces or rebel opposition groups 
fall into two broad categories. The first is 'forced recruitment,' the second is 'voluntary 
conscription.' 
Forced Recruitment 
Forced recruitment involves threats to an individual' s self, or family, and often includes 
physical violence. Forced recruitment is practised by both government and opposition forces 
alike, even in some States where conscription is defined by a legal age limit_? There are a 
number of different reasons for forced recruitment, all of which are interlinked. The first, and 
most predominant, is a shortage of soldiers. The others include class discrimination, population 
control, and ideology. 
A shortage of soldiers is the chief force in recruiting children to be trained as combatants. 
This has occurred in El Salvador, Guatemala, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Peru and Sri Lanka, to 
name but a few. 
7Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 24-29. 
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In Ethiopia and Mozambique, for example, a shortage of soldiers led to the recruitment of 
children. While in Ethiopia it was primarily the government forces that recruited children and 
youth, in Mozambique it was both the government armed forces (F AM) and the Mozambican 
resistance movement (Renamo ). In fact, Renamo openly encouraged the recruitment of children 
over adults, as former military advisers and deserters have testified. As one Renamo deserter, 
who was recruited at age ten, explains, "Renamo does not use many adults to fight because they 
are not good fighters ... kids have more stamina, are better at surviving in the bush, do not 
complain, and follow directions."8 No doubt Renamo found that children recruited as young as 
six years turned into the most fierce combatants through violent indoctrination. The same is said 
today about Liberian child soldiers.9 A typical Renamo practice was to take a child soldier back 
to his village and force him to kill someone close to him. The killing was conducted in such a 
way that his community knew what he had done, preventing the child' s return home. This 
practice ensures loyalty to the forces, as the child no longer has a family or community on whom 
he can rely. A relationship of dependency develops with his captors, and ultimately such a child 
comes to identify with the cause.10 Thus in the case ofRenamo, shortage of eligible soldiers was ' 
not the only motivation in their recruitment of children, but rather the fact that they could 
indoctrinate and produce more effective, brutal and loyal killers for their cause. This is 
undoubtedly one of the primary motivations in all recruitments. 
8"Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique," Africa Watch (July 
1992): 96-97. 
9Howard French, "Children Man Liberia' s Front Lines," The Globe and Mail, Monday May 13 1996. 
AliA?. 
10Cole P. Dodge and Magne Raundelen Reaching Children in War: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique, 
(Norway: Sigma Forlut, 1991), 57. 
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J In other instances of child recruitment due to a shortage of adult soldiers, there have also 
been other elements at work. One such example can be found in the recruitment drives of the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. This rebel group is engaged in a battle for independence in Northern 
Sri Lanka. In recent years, however, there has been a lack of adult sympathizers forcing the 
rebels to recruit increasingly younger guerillas for their struggle. It was reported that during a 
major attack in July 1995, one hundred and eighty Tamil Tigers were killed. More than half 
were between the ages of twelve and sixteen, and more than one hundred and twenty-eight were ' 
girls.11 This figure demonstrates that in times of conflict females are as vulnerable to recruitment 
as their male counterparts. However, it also shows the process working independently of veteran 
adult leadership, which has not been the case in many other regions. Here the children are the 
catalysts, proponents and recruiters, the consequences of which are devastating and which 
symbolize a far more sinister element at work within this society as a whole. 12 This aspect of 
forced recruitment is closely linked to another; that of institutionalized biases against particular 
segments of society. This is clearly illustrated in examples of mass roundups in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. 13 In both these countries the armed forces routinely seize young men out of buses, 
cars, churches and the marketplace, or simply as they walk down the street14 • These ' new' 
recruits generally comprise the poorer segments ofEl Salvadorean and Guatemalan society, and 
are members of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, few peasants have identity cards documenting 
1989). 
11Radda Bamen, "Children of War" (http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabamen/childsol5.html) 
12See also Development Education Forum No.3, June 1995. 17-18 
13 Youth Under Fire: Military Conscription in El Salvador (Eureka Springs: Center on War and the Child, 
14Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 24-29. 
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their date of birth. Therefore, it is often impossible for the children to prove that they are too 
young to qualify for service, or that they are exempted because they are students or the only son 
in the family. As new recruits they are moved to centres away from home, making it time 
consuming and costly for their families to locate them and plead their case. 15 As Cohn notes, 
the young men from wealthier families would not be found using public transportation which is a 
target area for recruitment sweeps. In the rare instance that they did, their families would have 
the necessary cash to pay "an unofficial fine in exchange for a son or brother."16 This class 
discrimination extends to the political arena where they have little or no representation, and as 
such no recourse to justice. Unfortunately, this lack of empowerment makes them easy victims 
for government and rebel forces alike, for those in authority know that the peasants cannot 
retaliate . 
.., Another reason for forced recruitment is the desire by warring factions to control the 
movements of the general population. Instances of this are to be found in both Peru and 
Guatemala. In Guatemala, indigenous Mayans were ordered into 'paramilitary civil defence 
patrols' (P ACs), by the governments military. Each member participated one day a week, 
meaning that time otherwise spent in employment or subsistence farming was lost. However, the 
refusal to participate resulted in exorbitant ' fines ', and included the threat of being killed. 17 
In Peru, a similar method of control occurs. Here the patrols are made up of women, 
young children and men. The government organized the patrols in an attempt to mobilize 
15Lutheran World Federation, Child Soldiers, Development Education Forum, no.3- June 1995, (Geneva, 
Lutheran World Federation, 1995), 11-12. 
16Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 25. 
17Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 25-26. 
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peasants against the guerilla movement Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and to ensure control 
of the peasants' movements. Peasant leaders have denounced these patrols for several reasons. 
Not only do they impose non-traditional leadership structures and values, but the leaders also 
argue that the patrols merely serve to increase violence, by and against patrollers. 18 Sendero 
Luminoso also recruits children under the age of fifteen, although they claim these children are 
"de-peasantized youth" who have left the countryside but could not find work in the city centres. 
It is estimated that 40% of Sendero Luminoso forces are women and children. 19 As is evident 
from these examples, this element of population control also reflects elements of institutionalized 
biases against particular segments of society, and serves to demonstrate the complexities with 
which workers in the field are faced. 
The final reasons for forced recruitment, are ideology and· indoctrination. Here the line 
dividing 'forced recruitment' from 'voluntary conscription' is narrowed, and the one crosses into 
the other. For ideology can be used forcefully as well as subtlely. While ideology may not be as 
obvious as a soldier forcibly recruiting a child through physical violence, it is nevertheless just as 
pervasive and forceful a mechanism. 
In discussing political violence and ideology, social scientist Maxwell Taylor re-affirms 
the psychologist Rokeach's definition of ideology, that is, "an organisation of beliefs and 
attitudes-religious, political or philosophical in nature-that is more or less institutionalized or 
shared with others ... " Taylor argues that this understanding of ideology describes a "process or 
context." This process or context may be expressed as a certain set of concepts and/or rules, by 
which we develop our actions. As such, it refers to the "framework and structure that gives 
18 Ibid.,28. 
19Lutheran World Federation, Child Soldiers, 15. 
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direction to behaviour and which sets in motion particular kinds of choices of activity. "20 Where 
that framework and structure is the source of conflict, it stands to reason that the behaviour it 
directs, as well as the choices and actions it offers, will be ones of violence. This is most evident 
in those countries where a religious or racially driven ethic is the underlying cause of violent 
conflict. It can be most starkly seen in Israeli occupied Palestine, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka 
and South Africa. 
The West Bank and Gaza Strip are home to approximately nine hundred thousand 
Palestinians, of which more than 60% are children.21 Up until the summer of 1994 they had been 
occupied by the Israeli military, who won control of these lands from Egypt in 1967. They have 
been the sites of some of the most brutal conflict between the Palestinian resistance movement, 
the Intifada, and the Israeli military. Physical living conditions are bleak and social structures 
such as playgrounds, sports clubs and even schools, have been destroyed through years of 
military rule and curfews. 22 Consequently, ideology is very powerful in resistance movements 
such as the Intifada. Children are the primary victims, falling into what one observer has termed 
" a dangerous mindset of resisting authority and admiring guns. "23 While there is little evidence 
to support overt forced recruitment, this dominant mindset works pervasively to encourage 
violent retaliation, and therefore rebel participation, on the part of Palestinian children. These 
children are ill-equipped to take on the might of the Israeli military. Consequently, the childrens' 
20Maxwell Taylor, The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence (London: Brassey's, 
1991), 80. 
21James Garbarino, Kathleen Kostelny and Nancy Dubrow, No Place to be a Child Growing up in a War 
Zone (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), 103. 
22Robert Semeniuk, "War Babies: Traumatized kids and the science of healing lost souls," Equinox 79 
(1995): 39. 
23 Ibid., 40. 
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actions such as throwing rocks and stones, merely serve to provoke and anger the soldiers who 
counter with far greater force. Yet despite the danger, these children continue to resist in this 
manner because of the ideology which surrounds, moulds and encourages their behaviour by 
glorifying them with slogans such as "Heroes of the Intifada" and "Children of the Stones."24 
Thus, while it does not appear to be forced participation such as the type experienced in the 
regions already discussed, neither is this recruitment entirely voluntary. Indeed, many 
psychologists and child experts question childrens' "cognitive capacity to think rationally about 
concepts such as ideology and nation."25 Despite the fact that some children claim loyalty to a 
specific political, religious or nationalistic ideology when taking up arms, the extent to which 
they comprehend the ideology is dubious. One Palestinian journalist argues that the militant 
children in Gaza have "a good command of the basics of politics. "26 Yet testimony given to 
workers in the field by young fighters, casts doubts on their "evaluative capacities ... with regard 
to a decision that has such serious consequences."27 
Furthermore, case workers argue that children are "highly influenced by factors they have 
little capacity to analyze" and are instead reciting " ... hateful, violent, or resentful lines that are 
sure to win the approval of those they love or those in charge."28 Consequently, Cohn argues that 
issues are oversimplified and understood in terms of 'black and white, good and bad, friend and 
enemy.' In support of this argument, Cohn relates evidence accumulated by the Centre on War 
24 Ibid., 41. 
25Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 35. 
26Daoud Kuttab, "A Profile of the Stonethrowers," Journal of Palestine Studies 14, no.18 (1988): 18. 
27Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conjlict,36. 
28Lutheran World Federation, Child Soldiers, 8. 
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and the Child, a non governmental organization based in Arkansas. The Centre confirms reports 
of Iranian children driven into war zones with inadequate training, but armed instead with 
headbands and jackets bearing religious slogans and granting 'permission' by the imam to enter 
heaven. Keys hang around their necks, supposedly to guarantee such an entry.29 In this instance 
it is clear that the prime motivation at work is undoubtedly a particular ideological end, of which 
the children are the means. This method of ideological indoctrination appears less forceful than 
many of the other methods employed because it occurs on a mental and spiritual level, as 
opposed to a physical level. Yet the consequences of this type of recruitment are just as dire as 
using physical force. Furthermore, ideological force is as abusive a form of recruitment as any of 
the others discussed. However, it is also obvious that those doing the recruiting could easily 
misconstrue such evidence so that it appears to be 'voluntary' recruitment on the part of children. 
Analysts have included a subsection to this category which they describe as ' coercive or 
abusive' recruitment. It is directed toward "those situations where there is no proof of direct 
physical threat or intimidation, but the evidence supports the inference of involuntary 
enlistment."30 However, the evidence they cite to support this category could very well be 
incorporated within the larger one of general forced recruitment. An example of this category is 
drawn from the period between the late 1980s and 1992 in a region of southern Sudan. During 
this period approximately twelve and a half thousand Sudanese boys roamed across two thousand 
kilometres of desert, stretching between Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya. It is suspected that they 
were removed from their families by the rebel Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army(SPLA) in 
order to maintain a future supply of fighters. It is reported that selection was based on the 
29 Ibid. , 12. 
30 Ibid., 28. 
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presence of two molar teeth, which would place them at approximately four years of age. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the children had 
received paramilitary training in Ethiopia, and had been employed as advance troops to clear 
minefields in the desert, ensuring a safe passage for later troops.31 While the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could find no evidence of the boys' military conscription, 
the fact that they reportedly had ' no sense of national identity' supports the speculation that they 
were removed at an extremely young age. A lack of national and personal identity would be one 
consequence of such action. As such, it is obvious that the children' s memory may not 
corroborate actions of forced removal or abduction, as they were too young to comprehend their 
situation. The evidence in this case is most certainly that of 'abusive recruitment. ' However, 
such cases do not warrant separate classification out of the main category of ' forced recruitment', 
and for the purposes of this study, will therefore be considered within this broader framework. 
Voluntary Recruitment 
Voluntary recruitment occurs when children actively volunteer themselves for service in 
the military, be it government or rebel forces. In these cases, the majority of child soldiers are 
not directly forced into service by military or rebel groups, but rather readily volunteer. 
However, the causes that underlie such actions are complex, and in most instances children do 
not have any viable alternative but to take up arms, as the pressures of daily survival which 
surrounds them are overwhelming. As Cohn remarks, "Their motivation lies in the very roots of 
the conflicts, in the predominant macro social, economic and political issues defining their 
31Panos Moumtzis, "Children of War," Refugees UNHCR Quarterly Report (July 1992): 30-32. 
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lives. "32 In order to prevent voluntary participation, it is necessary to confront these larger issues 
which force children to volunteer in the first place. The most dominant motives for volunteering 
include: revenge, socioeconomic status, lack of empowerment and the need for security, ideology 
and peer pressure. These motives, like the elements of forced recruitment, are closely 
interlinked. 
The desire for revenge is motivated by "personal experiences of physical abuse, torture, 
killing, disenfranchisement, deprivation, and humiliation.'m In the Gaza Strip, for instance, the 
Gaza Community Mental Health Plan (GCMHP) surveyed 2,779 Palestinian children during 
1992 and 1993. The children were between the ages of eight and fifteen, and the survey reports 
that 
93% were tear-gassed, 85% had their homes raided, 55% witnessed their 
fathers beaten, 42% were beaten, 31% were shot, 28% had a brother 
imprisoned, 19% have been detained, 3% had suffered death in their 
family ... and 69% were exposed to more than four different types of 
trauma.34 
The result of this is often the need for revenge, either for oneself, or because of violence towards 
friends or family. As one young boy replied, in response to being asked what he would like to be 
when he grows up, "I want to get a gun and kill the neighbours."35 A relative of the neighbours 
executed his fifteen-year old brother for suspicion of collaboration with the Israelis. While this 
need for revenge may give victims a sense of control in an environment in which they have little 
32Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conjlict,23 . 
33 Ibid., 42. 
34Robert Semeniuk, "War Babies: Traumatized Kids and the Science of Healing Lost Souls" 39. 
35 Ibid., 46. 
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control, political or otherwise, it also serves to encourage resolution through conflict, ultimately 
resulting in more violence. 
The desire for revenge is widespread. Cases to support it can be drawn from almost all of 
the regions in which children have been exposed to violence, from Latin America to Africa, 
Europe, the Middle East and Asia. 36 
Another common force driving children to volunteer is that. of social and economic 
poverty and injustice. As UNICEF reported on conditions in Sri Lanka in 1990, 
... wide disparities in socio-economic status, employment opportunities, and 
access to welfare services' contributed to ethnic tensions resulting in the 
outbreak of violence in the 1980s. That conflict in turn diverted funds away 
from welfare and social services to defence and internal security, generating 
a vicious circle in which, paradoxically, arms alone appear to ensure the 
best chance of survival.37 
Likewise, the director of the Liberian Red Cross acknowledged seven year olds were in combat 
because," those with guns could eat."38 This factor is closely linked to another, that is, the need 
for empowerment and security. 
In countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador, joining an armed group is often better 
than the alternative, which is forced recruitment by the army. Rebel Guatemalans spoke of the 
guerrilla movement in a far more favourable manner than they did of government forces. They 
reported that the movement did not beat or torture its members, provided traditional peasant food 
and values, clothes, medical attention and a support structure. As one young guerilla stated, 
36Evidence has been obtained from a wide range of countries such as; Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda and Rwanda. 
37Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 33. 
38 Ibid., 33 . 
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"people can at least imagine that the guerillas fight for the good of the people. "39 Thus, children 
gain a sense of empowerment and security in what must otherwise be a volatile, frightening and 
uncertain environment. This need for security and empowerment was also a prime factor 
motivating black communities within apartheid South Africa. 
Beginning in the late 70s, and carrying through until 1994, black South Africans 
organized themselves into street committees. Through these committees, children and youth 
were divided into paramilitary units, with a commander in charge of operations. These units 
reflected the political identities of the two major black organisations. The African National 
Congress (ANC) started the Self Defense Units (SDU), while the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
began the Self Protecting Units (SPU).40 Initially, these units were designed to protect residents 
against brutality from state security forces. However, as living conditions in black areas 
deteriorated, members of the SDU and SPU began fighting each other. This fighting soon 
escalated into a civil war, further destabilizing the area. 
"'The final factors influencing voluntary participation are those of peer pressure and 
ideology. Once again, as in forced recruitment, these are especially seen in those countries 
where a longstanding religious or racial conflict is present. It is particularly evident in the 
countries of the Middle East, Northern Ireland and South Africa. 
For example, a psychologist working in Israeli occupied West Bank states that her young 
patients most frequently cite ideology and peer pressure, alongside revenge, as motivation for 
their actions.41 These children do not want others to perceive them as weak or a~ cooperating 
39Ibid., 34-35. 
40Gedeon J Rossouw and J. Coley Lamprecht, "A social and psychological profile ofMilitarised Youth in 
Gauteng" unpublished paper. (Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University, 1996) 
4 1 Semeniuk, "War Babies: Traumatized Kids and the Science of Healing Lost Souls" 42. 
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with the enemy. Likewise, in Liberia and Sri Lanka, armed groups have glorified their actions to 
impressionable adolescents and have had them relay the message to fellow friends and 
classmates. When questioning children in these parts, Cohn reports that a common refrain is 
"My friends are joining." indicating the work of peer pressure.42 However, this pressure does not 
only come from fellow peers, but also from the childrens ' parents involved in the struggles. 
Most parents in the occupied territories of Palestine openly encourage and celebrate their 
childrens participation in the struggle, and are proud of their actions. 43 This element is also 
clearly seen in studies on children in Northern Ireland. The overwhelming presence of the 
ideology into which they are born is deeply reflected in their everyday lives. For instance, in 
Protestant areas boys play rugby and cricket, and talk of burning and killing the Fenians 
(Catholics). In Catholic neighbourhoods, boys play hurley and Gaelic football in between club 
meetings where they learn to construct petrol and nail bombs to hurl at the Prods(Protestants).44 
Thus their entire mental orientation is conditioned by the political and religious situation into 
which they are born. As such, it suggests that this mental orientation is cyclical, and the children 
of these children will develop this mindset, just as children today have been conditioned by their 
schools, social activities, parents and friends. 
In analyzing the forces behind child combatants, it is clear that they are both numerous 
and complex in nature. The fact that many choose of their own accord to participate in these 
conflicts, is irrelevant. What other options do they have? As Lennart Lindgren, Secretary 
General of Radda Barnen, astutely comments, 
42Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict ,40. 
43Kuttab, "A Profile ofthe Stonethrowers" 18. 
44Morris Fraser, Children in Conflict (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1973). 
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Children's participation in war should always be viewed as forced, no 
matter what drives them to make this decision. They may be driven by the 
dream ofmartyrdom,by the need for revenge or, simply, by hunger. Thus, 
the responsibility for their decision must lie in the surrounding world, 
because these children have not chosen the circumstances they are 
confronted with. 45 
The next chapter examines the consequences of children participating in armed combat. 
A study of these consequences is essential in establishing services to assist the demobilization of 
child soldiers, as well as lessening the long-term effects of war and violence directed at children, 
for these effects have serious consequences for the development of democratic politics. 
45Radda Barnen, "Children of War" ( http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabarnen/childsol5 .html.) 
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Chapter Three 
Consequences of Participation: The Relationship Between Child Soldiers and Political 
Order. 
This chapter examines the consequences of children' s participation in violent conflict. 
These consequences are evident at both a micro and macro level of society. Both negative and 
positive consequences, if any, are assessed. More importantly, this chapter demonstrates that 
violent conflict is rooted in socialization and that such socialization to violence poses serious 
risks to democratic political development. 
Explaining the Culture of Conflict 
The causes and nature of war and violent conflict are long-standing areas of study for 
political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists. Broadly speaking, two 
views dominate debate on the origins of war and violent conflict. One set of scholars, such as 
Bertrand Russell and E.O. Wilson, explain war and conflict from a socio-biological perspective. 
They argue that human beings are genetically predisposed to violence as a mechanism to ensure 
their survival by the transmission of genes from one generation to the next. 1 Other scholars, such 
as Clarke McCauley and David Matsumoto, argue that violent behaviour is not rooted in biology 
but rather in society.2 The origins of violence are, therefore, located within the constructs of 
cultural conditioning. 
1Clarke McCauley, "The Anthropology of War: Conference Overview," in The Anthropology of War, ed. 
Jonathan Haas (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
2McCauley, Ibid., 1-25. 
36 
Culture is broadly defined as a set of "attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviours shared by 
groups of people, communicated from one generation to the next via language and observation."3 
Culture influences human behaviour, not only how we perceive ourselves and others, but also 
how we interact with other people.4 In analyzing conflict and psychocultural orientations, 
scholars argue that in those cultures where individuals undergo harsh physical and emotional 
experiences, such individuals more often than not become involved in overt conflict. 
Furthermore, "a number of cross-cultural studies report a positive association between harsh 
socialization practices and physical aggression, bellicosity, and warfare. "5 
As such, what are the consequences of child soldiers and youth participating in violent 
armed combat? How does it affect national identity? And does it condition an ideology of 
violence, out of which arises a political climate of disorder and instability? Understandably, 
there is no single answer to these questions. This is partly due to the dramatically different 
conditions and experiences to which these children are subjected, such as the child' s psycho-
social and economic conditions prior to the war. These conditions will affect not only the way a 
child processes and interprets what has occurred, but will also influence the nature and degree to 
which a child participates in armed combat. As Cohn observes, "They may return home heroes 
or villains, to loving families and receptive communities; or they may have no home, no family 
and no identity beyond that of combatant."6 Thus, the consequences of children participating in 
3David Matsumoto, Psychology From a Cultural Perspective (Berkeley: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1994), 
177. 
4Matsumoto, Ibid., 178. 
5Marc Howard Ross, The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspectives 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 61. 
6Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 106. 
armed conflict differ from one context to another. Despite this, there are numerous 
commonalities that are observed across contexts and which are discussed below. 
Micro-Level Consequences: How Participating in Violent Conflict Affects Children and 
Youth 
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One of the most important factors in determining effects and consequences is the age at 
which children are recruited for service. If children are extremely young, as in the instance of the 
Sudanese boys, they will retain little memory of their families, communities, and way of life 
prior to war. This means that the group they are in often becomes a substitute family, and the 
children develop a bond with their fellow soldiers and captors. Subsequently, their identity is 
shaped by the circumstances surrounding them. Adult soldiers have the benefit of a 
psychological and sociological grounding which children do not. This enables adults to 
differentiate between that which is an acceptable way of life and that which is not; between that 
which is humanely right and wrong. While many scholars point out that the circumstances 
surrounding these children are generally less than ideal for producing role models, or favourable 
activities fostering growth and development, others have nevertheless pointed to some positive 
factors. These include the provision of material essentials such as food, clothing and shelter, as 
well as non-material items such as security, friendship, stability and a sense ofbelonging.7 This 
is particularly evident in cases where children were separated from their families due to death or 
fighting. 
For example, taking in orphaned or lost children is a common practice by armed groups 
in many regions where civil war rages. It is particularly common in developing countries. This 
7Roger Rosenblatt, Children of War (NewYork: Anchor Press, 1983), 101. 
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is partly a result of the labour structure, whereby women are the primary wage earners 
responsible for maintaining the family and household. In times of war the economic demands on 
women and young girls increase severely as shortages of supplies forces them further away from 
home. 8 Male family members are usually involved in the fighting, which leaves many young 
children alone or under the care of their elders. Consequently, it is easy for these children to 
become separated or abandoned and therefore be taken in by guerilla forces. 
In Uganda, for instance, the National Resistance Army (NRA) took in thousands of child 
soldiers in the mid 1980s, after these children lost their homes and families to government forces. 
Reports on Ugandan orphans state that these children were well treated, were not abused, and 
were instructed on the necessity of discipline, honesty and civil rights.9 Another study on 
Ugandan child soldiers assessed the "guerilla family." The study found that children had 
benefited from the 'discipline and dedication' of the guerillas, in that they did not steal or beg, 
and lived toward a goal in life. However, the study also reported that how these attributes 
translate into regular civilian life depends on a critical element. Those who were old enough to 
remember life before the guerillas, spoke more readily of returning to school and the need for 
peace. Those who were adopted into the guerilla family from a very young age had no 
recollection of a childhood or any other form of family life. Their experience and memory was 
solely that of "bushfighting, hiding, and wandering."10 As such, it is difficult to translate their 
experience into civilian life. This is the most critical obstacle faced by almost all child soldiers, 
and is the most damning consequence of their participation in armed conflict. 
8UNICEF, "The State of the World' s Children 1996" ( Http://www.unicef.org/sowc96k/antiwarl.htrn) 
9Peter Godwin, "The Boys' Own Anny" in The Times, London, 27 April1986. 42A 
1° Cole P. Dodge and Magna Raundalen, Reaching Children in War: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique 
(Norway: Sigma Forlut, 1991),48. 
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Child soldiers are not equipped with the necessary skills or education needed to rebuild a 
country following years of upheaval and disintegration. As a result, many turn to crime as a 
means of survival. This is a major problem in many of the regions where child soldiers were 
active. As Felix Mambule, Vice President of Mozambique' s Human Rights League, declared in 
June 1995 while addressing the issue of violent juvenile crime in the country, "You get these 
young boys who were born in the war and the only thing they know is fighting. When they are 
hungry ,they go to the nearest person or shop and kill or rob to get food. " 11 Likewise, within 
South Africa there is a strong connection between political violence and crime. As one analyst 
notes, "A general culture of violence has grown up alongside violent forms of state control." 12 In 
some areas of the country it is reported that youth were responsible for perpetrating 90% of the 
/ 
deaths in a given year. Tragically, violence is now viewed as ' inevitable' and 'normal' and it is 
increasingly difficult to separate political violence from criminal violence. 13 Furthermore, 
researchers in South Africa contend that child soldiers are unable to be an effective part of a 
market economy. This poses particular problems to South Africa' s fledgling democratic attempt 
to rebuild its economy and infrastructure in support of emerging democratic political institutions. 
Just as political institutions do not function within a vacuum, neither do businesses exist in 
isolation.14 
11Radda Barnen, "Children of War" ( Http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabarnen/childsol5.html) 
12Christine Liddell, Jennifer Kemp and Molly Moema, "The Young Lions: South African Children and 
Youth in Political Struggle," in The Psychological Effects of War and Violence on Children (Hillsdale: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1993),207. 
13Liddell, Kemp, Moema, Ibid., 205. 
14Gedeon Rossouw and J. Coley Lamprecht, "Career Counseling and Moral Responsibility in Developing 
Countries" Unpublished Paper, Rand Afrikaans University, 1996. 
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As scholars Gedeon Rossouw and J. Coley Lamprecht argue, businesses "are embedded 
in a complex network of relationships and contexts" one of which is societal. Consequently, 
"Within this social context the business stands in relation to both the state and the civil society 
and is dependent on both for survival."15 However, Rossouw and Lamprecht argue that 
militarized children and youth are excluded from "mainstream society" because of their 
involvement in military and criminal activities, thereby foregoing socialization to a market 
economy. Compounding this problem is the fact that militarized youth in South Africa are 
highly politicized to particular concepts which alienate them from entering a market economy in 
that, 
The freedom ideology to which they were exposed in the struggle against 
apartheid was full of communistic conceptions of the economy. These ideas 
are very simplistic and represent the market economy as an antagonistic 
system of mutual exploitation between capitalists and proletarians. The 
capitalist system as such is represented as immoral. 16 
Consequently, these youths exist on the periphery of civil society unable to find meaning 
in anything they do. As a result, "their existence is merely geared to survival because they 
experience no long-term security. Sabotage, indifference, irresponsibility, low motivation and 
low productivity are visible consequences .. .'m 
Thus, positive consequences of participation are oriented toward short-term rather than 
long-term gains. This view is supported by journalist Roger Rosenblatt, who interviewed 
children from conflict zones in Ireland, Palestine and Israel. 18 He observed that war gave these 
151bid., 1. 
161bid., 11 . 
171bid., 6. 
18Roger Rosenblatt, Children of War, 204. 
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children a sense of order, importance, and destiny in life as well as practical benefits such as 
physical fitness. He felt that their sense of need and care for others was heightened during a state 
of war, and as such was a good element. However, in assessing long-term gain he concluded that 
the involvement of children in warfare is ultimately destructive because it promotes and 
conditions them to accept one ideology and value system over another. Such an ideology and 
value system is constantly reaffirmed and supported in these childrens' schools, and by their 
peers and family. It is evident in the songs they sing, the pictures they draw, the poems and 
stories they write, and in the games they play. 
For example, in Northern Ireland, as in South Africa, Palestine, and Israel, history lessons 
are taught from two vastly different sets of curricula and interpretations. Thus a Catholic child 
will state that Dublin is the capital city, while a Protestant child will name Belfast as the capital. 
In Catholic schools great emphasis is attached to the Irish language, music and dancing, while in 
Protestant schools children belong to the Orange Lodges and learn the appropriate songs and 
slogans.19 In this way the political ideology is transmitted from one generation to the next. 
Furthermore, the method of achieving and maintaining that ideology is portrayed through 
violence. 
In the Gaza Strip Palestinian children play a game they call "Arabs and Jews." The 
smaller of the children play the Arabs, and are armed with stones, while the older and bigger 
children play Israeli soldiers armed with imitation M16 rifles and empty tear gas cans.20 While it 
may be argued that this is only a game, it nevertheless reflects the reality of their lives and the 
19Morris Fraser, Children in Conflict (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1973) See also, Ed Cairns and 
Ignatius J Toner, "Children and Political Violence in Northern Ireland: From Riots to Reconciliation." in The 
Psychological Effects ofWar and Violence on Children (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993). 
20Robert Semeniuk, "War Babies: Traumatized Kids and the Science of Healing Lost Souls" in Equinox, 
February 1995. 36. 
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means by which they have learnt to deal with it. Similar games can be observed in Ireland, South 
Africa and in almost every other country experiencing conflict. Furthermore, it presents violence 
as an acceptable part of everyday life. Consequently, children learn to speak the rhetoric and 
imitate the actions which allow the violence to continue through their generation. As Morris 
Fraser comments in observing children in Ireland, "the trouble in Ulster is not that the Protestants 
have been unfair to the Catholics, or the Catholics hostile to the Protestants. The trouble is that 
people think in these terms at all."2 1 The same could be said about any of the regions discussed. 
It is this that is potentially threatening to long-term peace, stability and reconciliation. 
Thus there are more negative than positive consequences of children participating in 
armed conflict. These are, severe long-term psychological effects associated with violence and 
trauma, including juvenile delinquency and discipline problems, a lack of necessary education 
and skills due to lost school time, and physical injury. 
J Child psychologists, observing and working with many children in different contexts of 
war and violence, noted that child victims were able to recover a reasonable level of mental well 
being with the help of therapy. However, those children who actively participated in the 
violence by killing or any other means, showed less ' recuperative powers' and demonstrated 
severe mental distress.22 These include, frequent occurring nightmares, chronic fear and anxiety, 
the desire for revenge, feelings of guilt and retribution, communication problems, lack of 
personal identity, and suspicion of adults and authority figures. Without the necessary therapy 
and rehabilitation, it is likely that such children will continue a life of violence as a means of 
21Morris Fraser, Children of War, 129. 
22Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 109. See also James Garbarino et al, 
Children in Danger (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991). 
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escape. As Neil Boothby noted during clinical sessions with child soldiers in Ethiopia, 
Guatemala and elsewhere, " their psychological turmoil became most acute after they laid down 
their guns and attempted to reenter civilian communities."23 In one example he tells of a fifteen-
year old boy who was a Khmer Rouge Cadre for four years. The boy began hearing two voices 
in his head, arguing with each other. One was the voice of a Khmer Rouge leader who was angry 
with him for deserting, the other was the voice of a Buddhist priest who told the boy that even 
when he died he would be punished for what he had done. As is evident from this case and 
many others far worse, this young boy will experience extreme difficulty in becoming a 
functional member of society. There are thousands like him. 
Physical injury is another serious factor, particularly in developing countries where health 
care is often minimal and access to reconstructive surgery is almost non existent. In 
Mozambique it is estimated that almost two thirds of their future workforce were seriously 
maimed and injured during the war. This is an important factor to a developing country which 
relies heavily on human physicallabour.24 
The loss of valuable school time due to warfare is another consequence which further 
compounds the problem. Schools have frequently closed down in Palestine, Ireland, South 
Africa, Mozambique and elsewhere during conflict, and those children recruited into the forces 
do not receive any education other than combat training. Consequently, when fighting ceases 
these children do not have the skills needed to reenter civil society. Those fortunate enough to 
have experienced school prior to the army will sometimes wish to return, if they are not 
23Neil Boothby, War and Refugee Children (London: Oxford University Press, 1990), 55 
24Cole P. Dodge and Magna Raudelen. War, Violence and Children in Uganda, (Norway: Sigma Forlut, 
1991) 
210. 
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irretrievably lost to the power of the gun. Unfortunately for many the opportunity to return to 
school does not exist. Many of these children are orphaned or displaced, and therefore do not 
have the means to pay for school fees as they must work simply to eat.25 It is the desperation of 
such a situation that forces many young people into a life of crime and violence, as is evident in 
South Africa, Mozambique, and many other regions. 
Furthermore, many children develop a hostile attitude toward institutions of authority as 
well as a single-minded ideological orientation. Commenting on Liberian child soldiers, one 
journalist states that, " .. war provides these children with a powerful sense of authority and 
belonging."26 As a result, they may experience difficulty in resolving problems. As one analyst 
notes in regard to South African youth, " .. violent reaction to community problems may lead to 
young people being incapable of developing more flexible and cooperative strategies for solving 
problems," and furthermore that " Having forfeited their childhoods in the interests of liberation, 
and having wielded substantial power, the devolution of power to older political leaders may 
prove difficult for many young people to accept. "27 
As such, this socialization to violence threatens the very democracy for which they sacrificed so 
much. 
25See War, Violence and Children in Uganda, ed. by Cole Dodge and Magna Raundalen. 
26Howard French, "Children Man Liberia's Front Lines" A 1-A 7. 
27Liddell, Kemp, and Moema, "The Young Lions: South African Children and Youth in Political Struggle" 
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Macro-Level Consequences: How Child Soldiers Affect Democratic Political Development 
In discussing the means and processes of building democracies, Guiseppe Di Palma, 
amongst others, refers to the tactics of accommodating the needs and interests of business, state, 
and labor sectors. He argues that accommodating the interests of all significant actors greatly 
reduces the risk of challenges to the transition process. It is what O'Donnell and Schmitter refer 
to as negotiating pacts and redefining agreements. 28 Di Palma argues that, 
. .if the agreement does not include, or is not drawn with an eye to, 
significant actors, then single democratic institutions may well be adopted 
and put to work. But their effectiveness and persuasiveness-their capacity 
eventually to co-opt those who stayed out of the agreement-are in 
jeopardy.29 
While he too sees the military as an important institution which must be included in the 
negotiation of pacts and the decision making process, he, like others, fails to consider the 
inclusion of children in the make-up of military and rebel groups within many countries 
undergoing transitions. It is vital that both scholars and political bodies do so, for child soldiers 
comprise a significant percentage of the recruits within both government military forces and 
rebel groups alike, and it is here that Rustow' s background condition of national unity becomes 
relevant. The processes of transition and democratization often make military and revolutionary 
groups redundant, for once a transition is successfully underway there is no longer a need for 
their activities.3° Consequently, this group of"significant actors" is alienated. Furthermore, the 
lack of necessary skills on the part of child soldiers hinders their ability to become contributing 
28Guillerino O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37. 
29Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 111. 
30Jeffrey J. Ryan," The Impact of Democratization on Revolutionary Movements," Comparative Politics, 
October 1994, 27-41. 
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members of a renewed, non-violent, civil society. This is a serious threat to democratic political 
development in those regions where they are active. Why? Because violence becomes endemic, 
passed on from generation to generation. Consequently, the basic stability required for the 
creation of political institutions, which is in turn the prerequisite of democratic government, is 
lost in a culture of violence. People become displaced during the years of ongoing conflict, 
communities are tom apart, and society as a whole ceases to function in a manner resembling 
regular everyday life. As Francis Deng comments in referring to the dilemma of the internally 
displaced in civil conflict, 
Civil wars, especially those pertaining to racial, ethnic, and religious 
conflicts, tend to reflect an identity crisis, which generates cleavages 
between the controlling powers, be they governments or other controlling 
authorities, and the affected civilian population. As a result, this population 
often falls into a vacuum wherein responsibility normally associated with 
state sovereignty is abrogated or undermined.31 
Consequently, when a nation witnesses intense brutality over a sustained period of time, 
it fundamentally alters the perceptions, expectations and, most importantly, the national identity 
of its people. Thus, violence affects identity and identity affects and determines to a large degree 
the manner in which a nation state governs. Furthermore, in affecting national identity it 
ultimately affects national unity, which Rustow argues is the fundamental prerequisite for the 
establishment of a democracy. More specifically, generations of children grow up without 
knowing any other way of life. This situation is exacerbated further when those doing the killing 
and maiming are children as opposed to adults. This is because adults often have the benefit of 
psychological and sociological grounding which children do not. This problem radiates out far 
31Francis M. Deng, "Dealing with the Displaced: A Challenge to the International Community," Global 
Governance, 1:1 (Winter 1995): 45-57. 
beyond the parameters of psychology, social work, and the family unit. When there are 
generations of people who have no respect for the authority invested in the institutions of state, 
who cannot identify with such institutions because their ideology has been moulded through 
brutality and therefore know no other way except violence, is it any wonder that democratic 
transitions have not been successful? As experts in the field observe, 
Too many of the world' s conflicts reveal this terrible circular dynamic. 
Children manage to cope with the trauma of war by holding fast to an 
ideology that explains and justifies their lives, but when they grow up this 
same ideology spurs them to continue the war and subject another 
generation of children to suffering.32 
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Thus, the consequences for political order, stability, and democracy are immense. Plato 
and Aristotle believed that the values citizens hold directly affect the nature of their political 
institutions, and that the failures of such institutions reflect a larger social dilemma. As de 
T ocqueville argues, in assessing the conditions and structures essential to American democracy, 
that which is most important above all else are the "manners and customs" of the people. 33 Later 
socialization theorists agree that political explanations are found within the "beliefs, values and 
knowledge of the average citizen."34 This complex of beliefs and values shapes a nation' s 
political culture, which in turn shapes its governing institutions. 
Political culture is defined as "the pattern of distribution of orientations members of a 
political community have toward politics. This patterned collectivity of orientations influences 
32James Garbarino, Kathleen Kostelny and Nancy Dubrow, No Place to Be a Child: Growing Up in a War 
Zone, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), 23. 
33 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), 322. 
34Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization, (Boston: Little-Brown and Co., 1969), 26. 
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the structure, operation, and stability of political life. "35 Political socialization is the process 
which moulds, transmits, maintains, transforms and creates a nation' s political culture from one 
generation to the next. The agents of political socialization include the family, peer groups, 
education and schooling, social groups and communication media.36 However, in countries 
where political instability and violence are the norm such agents are frequently fractured and 
under extreme stress, serving at the worst to promote an ideology of violence, and at the least 
merely coping from day to day unable to constructively aid in ending the violence. Furthermore, 
when children are active in violent armed combat their entire identity, political and otherwise, is 
learned through violent experience. There are few institutions which are able to give meaning 
and direction to their lives, and which make sense of their experience. Consequently, there is a 
direct link between these children' s political learning, public order, and the institutions they will 
later use to govern. As de T ocqueville wisely notes, 
We must begin higher up; we must watch the infant in his mother's arms; 
we must see the first images which the external world casts upon the dark 
mirror of his mind, the first occurrences that he witnesses; we must hear the 
first words which awaken the sleeping powers of thought, and stand by his 
earliest efforts if we would understand the prejudices, the habits, and the 
passions which will later rule his life. The entire man is, so to speak, to be 
seen in the cradle of the child. 37 
Thus, child soldiers are not only a threat to the initial process of transition, they also 
impose a formidable barrier to the long-term consolidation of new and fragile democracies. In 
failing to acknowledge the existence of child soldiers, as well as the societal problems caused by 
35 Ibid., 27. 
36 Ibid., 99. 
37de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 27-28. 
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their participation in violent conflict, fledgling democratic institutions risk being weakened and 
undermined. Consequently, these new political institutions are unable to govern effectively, let 
alone consolidate their rule. Some may argue that children have no place within the political 
arena and could not actively participate in the negotiating of pacts and other decision-making 
processes. Nevertheless, child soldiers are a real force within the civil society which will 
ultimately support or reject the new political institutions of democracy. As DiPalma astutely 
notes in commenting on the exclusion of significant players in the democratic process, "In the 
absence of a collective agreement, democratic institutions are weakened by dissenters and the 
uncommitted and are unable to emerge as the sites for processing conflict."38 
Until such time as children are removed from the military, be they government or rebel 
forces, or are provided with the necessary therapy upon cessation of the violence, transitions and 
consolidation of democracies in countries such as Uganda, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Palestine and 
Northern Ireland, will continue to be undermined and threatened by renewed conflict. 
38Guiseppe DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, 134. 
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Chapter Four 
Preventive and Reconstructive Measures To Assist Child Soldiers. 
This chapter analyzes the measures and initiatives undertaken to prevent the recruitment 
of child soldiers. It also examines existing structures assisting the rehabilitation of those children 
already involved in armed combat. These measures and structures operate at both national and 
international levels, and are essential to the development of long-term social and political 
stability. 
National and International Initiatives 
As the previous chapters show, there are large numbers of child soldiers experiencing the 
devastating effects of armed combat. 
Traditionally, aid and relief measures to victims of war tom regions have aimed at treating the 
general aftermath of warfare, that is, dealing with the basic and immediate short term needs of a 
war ravaged community. These needs include food and medical supplies, housing, water 
sanitation, the restoration of a safe infrastructure, and family relocation programs. While 
obviously necessary and important, these elements do not sufficiently address the particular 
needs of child soldiers. However, with an increasing level of awareness surrounding the issue of 
child combatants and the problems they face in reentering a civilian life, greater efforts are being 
made to accommodate their specific needs. These efforts extend across local and national levels 
to the international arena. 
One of the most immediate measures undertaken involves setting up demobilization 
campaigns and trauma units. These measures are fairly recent, compared to traditional aid in the 
form of material supplies, yet demobilization campaigns and trauma units have greater potential 
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for producing long-term stabilizing affects in the regions where they are operational. In some 
instances such measures are implemented while hostilities are still ongoing, such as occurred in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this depends on the nature and intensity of the conflict, as it is 
not always possible to work within those regions where fighting is excessive. Examples of 
demobilization and trauma units at work can be found as far afield as the former Yugoslavia, 
Angola, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, and Palestine. 
In the former Yugoslavia the United Nations Children' s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 
there are approximately one million children who are psychologically war traumatized within the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina region alone. 1 However, children were not overtly active as combatants in 
this region. Despite this, trauma units were considered critical to the reconstruction process due 
to the severe intensity of atrocities children were subjected to. 
Consequently, UNICEF worked closely with local professionals in Yugoslavia to develop 
a psycho-social rehabilitation programme to aid these children. UNICEF concentrated their 
efforts in those cities where atrocities were particularly acute and ongoing, such as Sarajevo and 
Mostar. Their programmes help teachers and counsellors identify the symptoms associated with 
war trauma, such as Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, and equip them with the necessary skills to 
deal with such trauma. Using the classroom as a means to reach children ensures that as many as 
possible have access to therapy, and furthermore that therapy is done in an environment which is 
friendly, safe, and non-isolated, giving children the chance to interact with one another. This 
provides a "normalising" atmosphere. Those children who display severe suffering are referred 
1United Nations Childrens' Fund (Unicef), Office of the Special Representative to the Republics of the 
Fonner Yugoslavia, lnfonnation Division, Unicefin Former Yugoslavia, 1994a. Unicef stresses that the situation 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is extremely complex, and that all data should be taken with reservations. 
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to child psychologists for clinical help.2 An integral part of the psychosocial rehabilitation 
programme in Yugoslavia is the distribution of recreational and educational materials. Special 
creative kits were developed for children in refugee camps and war zones. These kits give 
children the means to express their feelings through drawing, painting, and other activities. As 
such, they provide a sense of normality to these children' s lives, as well as providing their 
teachers, parents and counsellors the opportunity of assessing any serious psychological damage. 
UNICEF reports that such a pilot programme undertaken for five thousand children in Sarajevo 
shows encouraging results. 3 
Angola is estimated to have more than ten thousand child soldiers, with approximately 
1.5 million additional war affected children. A mobile war trauma unit was set up in Angola' s 
capital, Luanda. This project was started in 1994 by the Christian Children' s Fund (CCF), a · 
child and family development organization that works in conjunction with a variety of 
community organizations, church groups and government departments.4 Similar to the 
programme in the former Yugoslavia, the project allows experienced professionals to teach 
groups of adults how to identify and help children with war related psycho-social problems.5 So 
far, the unit has trained five hundred adults and is expected to expand to surrounding areas in the 
near future. 
In Uganda, similar programmes to re-integrate child soldiers into civilian life were 
operational since 1986. These are run by the Ugandan government with assistance from outside 
2United Nations Childrens' Fund (Unicef), Office of the Special Representative to the Republics of the 
Former Yugoslavia, Information Division, Unicef Psychosocial Programme, 1994b. 
3Unicef 1994b. 
4Radda Barnen, "Children of War" (http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabarnen/childsol7html) 
5lbid., http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabarnen/childsol7html 
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organisations such as World Vision International, a christian humanitarian organisation. 
Likewise, UNICEF is working with the Rwandan authorities and local community groups in 
ninety centres across the country to assist in the demobilization, education and rehabilitation of 
four thousand child soldiers between the ages of ten and sixteen. This number could prove to be 
much greater, for it is estimated that there are ninety-five thousand unaccompanied children in 
Rwanda, many of whom could be part of military units.6 The Trauma Recovery Programme 
(TRP) was created by UNICEF' s Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances Section 
(CEDC) to address the needs of these children. Its workers have trained nearly two thousand 
Rwandan 'social agents,' that is, teachers, caregivers, NGO staff, health and social workers, as 
well as church and community leaders, in basic trauma treatment methods. It is too early to 
determine the success or failure of these measures. 
In Palestine the political-religious situation is such that it is more difficult for trauma 
programs to be implemented. It is only in the past few years that Palestinians have gained 
control of health care facilities and other relevant services in the previously Israeli occupied 
territories. These structures are new and fragile, and are in dire need of funding and professional 
expertise. Furthermore, severe religious and cultural taboos about mental illness within this 
society pose a serious obstacle to the establishment of such centres.7 Despite these obstacles Dr. 
Eyed el-Sarraj, a noted Psychiatrist, founded the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme 
(GCMHP) in 1990 with the aid of international donors (such as the Canadian Embassy which 
6United Nations Childrens' Fund (Unicef), Rwanda Field Office, Children First Information Notes, 1995, 
2. 
7 Robert Semeniuk," War Babies: Traumatized Kids and the Science of Healing Lost Souls" in Equinox, 
February, 1995. 41. 
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contributed $50,000).8 He estimates that there are approximately forty thousand Palestinian 
children who need immediate psychiatric help. The GCMHP is the areas ' s only facility, 
operating with three outlets. Nevertheless, it has treated more than seven thousand patients, half 
of whom were children. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the GCMHP works through local schools to 
reach children and their families, in order to increase understanding and tolerance of children' s 
rights and needs. Workers report that those treated so far show promising results.9 
Another measure essential to the reconstruction process, following prolonged civil 
conflict, is the reestablishment of schools and educational programmes that allow the recognition 
and expression of these children's experiences. Not only does this restore a sense of normality to 
children' s lives, but as evidenced in Mozambique and South Africa, without it there is a greater 
chance that children will revert to juvenile delinquency and violent crime. Schools are always a 
vital part of general reconstruction programmes, but as witnessed in Yugoslavia and Palestine, 
they are also an integral part of the psycho-social programmes. 
In those countries where a strong political ideology pervaded education and fostered the 
persistence of singular ideological mindsets, such as Northern Ireland and South Africa, 
integrated school systems are increasingly encouraged as a model to break this cycle. In Ireland, 
for example, it is hoped that such systems will provide a means for increased levels of 
communication between children of Catholic and Protestant faith, thereby reducing feelings of 
hatred and suspicion, which lead to their recruitment into violent organizations. 10 The 
8 Ibid., 39. 
9 Ibid., 39-42. 
10Ed Cairns and J. Toner Ignatius, "Children and Political Violence in Northern Ireland: From Riots to 
Reconciliation," in The Psychological Effects of War and Violence on Children, ed. Lewis A. Leavitt and Nathan A. 
Fox, (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993), 221. 
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curriculum is known as 'Education for Mutual Understanding,' and is now compulsory even in 
segregated schools. The programme is funded and supported by the Irish government but also 
receives professional input from educators and psychologists abroad. Researchers studying these 
programmes have reported positive results. These results include intercommunity friendships 
where children develop a better understanding of each other' s politics, and show less acceptance 
for confrontation. 11 Similar initiatives are to be found within South Africa. While the process 
needs to occur on a much larger scale in South Africa, than that in existence in Northern Ireland, 
it too has had positive results where in practice. These results include interracial friendships as 
well as a greater understanding of the history and culture of other races. This serves to diminish 
negative stereotypes children may have grown up with, and fosters better communication across 
the dividing barrier of race. 
These measures, while tentatively successful, face numerous obstacles in their 
implementation. They often lack funds, expertise, and government support at the national and 
international levels. This is because the existence of child soldiers is usually not recognized in 
formal peace accords and other demobilization documents. Technically, this means that child 
combatants do not exist and therefore do not have access to benefits. 12 However, organizations 
like the International Labour Organization (ILO) are now more aware of this issue, since they are 
responsible for helping new government' s plan the re-integration of armed groups. Given that 
child soldiers form one of those groups, yet are not recognized as such, the ILO commissioned 
the International Catholic Child Bureau (ICC) to undertake six case studies on the re-integration 
of child soldiers. The countries involved were Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and 
11Ibid., 225. 
12Radda Bamen, "Children of War" (http://childhouse.uio.no/raddabamen/childsol7.html) 
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Uganda. The purpose of the study was to investigate how education and special programmes 
could be implemented to aid these children. Furthermore, a group of non-governmental 
organizations led by the Quaker United Nations office in Geneva is undertaking a major study on 
child soldiers. The study was commissioned by the United Nations General Assembly and will 
consist of field work within thirty countries. The results of the study will be presented to the 
General Assembly in the autumn of 1996.13 Other critically important organizations involved in 
the issue of child soldiers, apart from UNICEF, are the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, and their respective affiliates. 
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies exist at national levels in one-
hundred and sixty-nine countries (with Red Crescent representing Islamic Nations.)14 These 
national societies provide a wide range of services including emergency relief, health services, 
and social assistance. In times of war they act as auxiliaries to army medical units, as well as 
aiding prisoners and refugees. They also provide tracing services to help re-unite missing 
families. The actions of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are defmed by the seven 
fundamental principles of the organization. These principles are humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. 15 The International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) acts as a liaison body for the 
various national societies, and represents them at the international level. The federation 
organizes and co-ordinates international disaster responses in support of affected national 
societies. It also encourages the creation of new national societies by assisting in the 
131bid., http:/ I childhouse. uio .no/raddabarnen/ childsol7 .html 
14lnternational Federation of The Red Cross, ( http://www.ifrc.org/_RC/RCRC.html) 
15For more information on the code of conduct governing these bodies see, The International Federation of 
The Red Cross, ( http://www.ifrc.org/code/code.html.) 
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development of a country's structures and programmes. Another important body affiliated to the 
IFRC is the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC is a private, independent, and 
non-political institution. During international conflict, civil wars and internal upheaval, the 
ICRC acts as a neutral intermediary in humanitarian matters. It provides protection and 
assistance to both military and civilian victims. The ICRC's role during armed conflict is 
defined by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their additional protocols of 1977.16 
Working together with The Henry Dunant Institute in Geneva, these organizations play a pivotal 
role in bringing attention to the issue of child soldiers, and lead the field in research initiatives. 
They recently proposed a comprehensive 'Plan of Action' on child soldiers and children in 
violent conflict, in search of preventive and therapeutic measures. The plan has three broad 
objectives to which its proponents are committed. 17 The first is to promote the principle of non-
recruitment and non-participation of children under the age of eighteen into armed combat. They 
plan to achieve this by promoting national and international legal standards, with emphasis on 
enforcement by armed groups such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Corp. Their basis for 
action is that international law protecting children often includes, and is developed from, 
domestic laws. Therefore, national societies are encouraged to stress implementation and 
improvement of these legal standards. Furthermore, national societies may play a crucial role in 
establishing alternatives for children at high risk of recruitment, such as youth centres and 
vocational skills facilities. 
16Ibid., http://www.ifrc.org/ _ ICRC.htrnl. 
17Henry Dunant Institute, Children in Armed Conflicts: Plan of Action for the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, August 1995. 
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The second objective is to take direct action to protect and assist child victims. Such 
action includes addressing the psycho-social and physical needs of victims, as well as advocating 
in favour of child soldiers once conflict has ended. This is an effort to help children be accepted 
back into their communities, as well as to recognize them as soldiers, so that they may benefit 
from official demobilization programmes which are normally denied them. 
The third and fmal objective is to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the 
measures proposed. The plan recommends that an "international coordinating group" be created 
to do this. This would act as a network for all national and international societies concerned with 
child soldiers. 
All of these initiatives are encouraging, for in acknowledging the existence and needs of 
child soldiers a process is set in motion whereby solutions can be offered. However, the most 
significant development affecting child soldiers is undoubtedly the drafting and ratification of 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). This United Nations treaty was established in 
1989 and has since been ratified by one hundred and forty-four nation states.18 As a legal 
instrument it is considered a landmark achievement in the protection of children. 
The Convention on the Rights of The Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has its origins in a document presented by the 
Polish government to the thirty-fourth session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1978. 
Polish interest in the protection of children dates back to the Second World War when more than 
two million Polish children were killed, many of whom were subjected to persecution and 
18Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 169. 
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medical experiments by the Nazis. From then on Poland continually pressed for the adoption of 
a legally binding article, within the boundaries of International Law. 19 However, the timing for 
the adoption of a legally-binding convention, as opposed to a non-binding declaration, was 
questioned by many states and organisations working within the field of human rights and 
international law. Many felt that ongoing research into the ways and means of implementing 
international instruments, so that they were both credible and functional, should be given 
priority. This work, they argued, would ultimately benefit the drafting and implementation of a 
convention on the rights of the child. Consequently, the drafting process was delayed until the 
results of other studies were available. Serious work on the Convention fmally began in the early 
eighties, and was completed in 1989.20 Its drafting was done both by nation states and non-state 
actors such as non-governmental organisations and specialized agencies with expertise in the · 
field. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child embraces a wide range of issues and problems 
that concern the protection, growth, and well being of the world's children. Article 38, which 
concerns the participation of children in armed conflicts and the question of their rights and 
protection, was undoubtedly one of the most controversial issues discussed during negotiations 
of the convention. It was resolved in a manner which many parties felt was unsatisfactory, even 
after the final adoption of the convention, and as such there is still ongoing debate concerning 
certain particulars.21 
1~awrence Leblanc, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: United Nations Lawmaking on Human 
Rights (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1995). 
20Jbid. 
21Jbid., 148. 
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This debate centres around the age limitation applied to children and youth in armed 
conflict. The initial proposals concerning child soldiers did not stipulate an age limitation, as the 
proposers assumed that State parties would abide by the basic definition of childhood as defined 
in Article 1 of the convention. This definition defines a child as any person under the age of 
eighteen.22 However, once discussion was underway several delegations (the United Kingdom, 
Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union) argued that in terms of participation in armed 
conflict, Article 38 should qualify the definition of a child. These delegates all suggested the 
minimum age for recruitment and participation be set at fifteen. This age limit was supported by 
the ICRC who noted that the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1977, also set 
fifteen as the minimum age for recruitment. As such, they argued that Article 3 8 would be 
consistent with existing international law. However, some delegates such as the Swiss, Swedish, 
Austrian and Belgian delegations, argued that treaties and conventions were meant to advance 
the development of international law, not simply be consistent with it.23 The matter was finally 
resolved by setting the legal age at fifteen, but declaring that State parties should give priority to 
recruits closer in age to eighteen, rather than fifteen, when recruiting from this age group. 
Delegates also agreed that discussion on this issue would continue in an effort to reach a more 
protective resolution. Thus, Article 38 of the Convention deals expressly with the issue of child 
soldiers. It rules that: 
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the 
child. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
221bid., 150. 
231bid., 151. 
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3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age 
of fifteen years into the armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who 
have attained the age of fifteen years but have not attained the age of eighteen 
years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest. 
4. In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to 
protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all 
feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an 
armed conflict.24 
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Convention obligates states to take whatever measures necessary 
"to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim 
of.. .armed conflicts. Such recovery and integration shall take place in an environment which 
fosters the health, self respect and dignity of the child." 25 
While the creation of a legally binding article concerned with the rights of children in 
armed conflict is indeed a positive achievement, it is also one that is riddled with numerous 
complexities that make it difficult to implement and enforce. International Law is in itself an ill-
defmed and weak instrument that often fails to be executed in a satisfactory manner. 
Conventions that fall within its boundaries for administration consequently bear the problems 
associated with it. Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child is designed for and 
signed by sovereign nation states. As such, there are no provisions for children who are part of 
armed groups that are not part of government forces. Given that most child soldiers are recruited 
into rebel movements, approximately seventy percent, this convention cannot be applied to them 
as the international law courts can only enforce rules on member states, not organizations. As 
one observer wryly comments, 
The international community does not yet possess even the most basic 
mechanism for averting large-scale violations of human rights. Reconciling 
24Ibid., 149. 
25Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, 137. 
., 
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the clear need for intervention in certain circumstances with the sanctity of 
the sovereign state remains the most intractable puzzle confronting the 
international governance community and the people and organizations that 
inhabit it.26 
It is this that makes the Convention on the Rights of the Child difficult to implement, oversee 
and enforce. Nevertheless, it is at least a foundation from which to work, and one which 
provides those in the field with a guideline by which they can measure what can be done and 
what as yet still has to be addressed. 
Conclusion 
While all of these measures and initiatives are of obvious and immense importance, the 
work is primarily being done by non governmental agencies and international humanitarian 
organizations. National governments and their respective political institutions of state need to do 
more. 
Firstly, they need to acknowledge the existence of child soldiers. Secondly, they have to 
recognize the problems associated with child participation in armed conflict, and thirdly they 
have to acknowledge the work being done by other organizations within their respective 
countries so that such work is deemed credible. In attempting to reconstruct and build 
democratic institutions in those countries where vast numbers of children have participated in 
brutal armed combat, the success and longevity of such institutions are hinged to a large degree 
on whether those children are successfully able to re-integrate into civil society and are equipped 
with the necessary skills to do so. For institutions do not function within a vacuum, independent 
of social forces. 
26Michael Bryans, "Making Sense of Humanitarian Intervention," Peacebuilding (Mar. 1995),4 . 
Failing to achieve the reintegration of child soldiers into civil society will result in 
continued outbreaks of violence, and the flagrant disregard for the authority invested in the 
institutions of state. Democratic political development will ultimately be elusive. 
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Conclusion 
The child soldier is a criticallynchpin determining success or failure of democratic 
transitions in many countries. Despite the obvious importance of this, political scientists have 
ignored how child soldiers affect the political. While scholars in fields of psychology, sociology, 
and education have realised the need to study the consequences of this phenomenon, political 
scientists have not. Yet the ability of fledgling democratic institutions to successfully 
consolidate their rule is greatly influenced by social forces. Given that child soldiers are a 
significant force within a country's civil society, it is imperative that scholars and political 
institutions alike include them as such. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the literature on democratic political 
development, pointing out the glaring omission of child soldiers as a critical variable in processes 
of democratization. In doing so, it offers an alternative explanation for the failure of democratic 
transitions in many countries and demonstrates why institutions alone are not enough. Society 
cannot build institutions if it does not have the social base to do so. 
In assessing evidence from countries such as South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel, 
Palestine, Mozambique and Uganda it is clear that militarized children and youth do perpetuate 
violence. This in tum creates a climate of instability which hinders the establishment of 
democratic political institutions. 
Consequently, this thesis supports continued work on procedures preventing the 
recruitment of child soldiers. It further recommends the establishment of demobilization 
campaigns, trauma units, and other such centres aiding the re-integration to civil society of such 
children. Without these initiatives the potential for renewed violence and instability is immense, 
and democratic political development risks perpetual failure. 
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